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Abstract                          
This work offers an approach to conceptualizing, 
demarcating and analyzing a national web. Instead of 
defining a priori the types of websites to be included in 
a national web, the approach put forward here makes 
use of web devices (platforms and engines) that purport 
to provide (ranked) lists of URLs relevant to a particu-
lar country. Once gathered in such a manner, the 
websites are studied for their properties, following 
certain of the common measures (such as responsive-
ness and page age), and repurposing them to speak in 
terms of the health of a national web: Are sites lively, 
or neglected? The case study in question is Iran, which 
is special for the degree of Internet censorship under-
taken by the state. Despite the widespread censorship, 
we have found a highly responsive Iranian web. We 
also report on the relationship between blockage, 
responsiveness and freshness, i.e., whether blocked 
sites are still up, and also whether they have been re-
cently updated. Blocked yet blogging portions of the 
Iranian web show strong indications of an active Inter-
net censorship circumvention culture. In seeking to 
answer, additionally, whether censorship has killed 
content, a textual analysis shows continued use of 
language considered critical by the regime, thereby in-
dicating a dearth of self-censorship, at least for websites 
that are recommended by the leading Iranian platform, 
Balatarin. The study concludes with the implications of 
the approach put forward for national web studies, 
including a description of the benefits of a national web 
health index.
Introduction: 
National web studies
In 2007, Ricardo Baeza-Yates and colleagues at Yahoo! 
Research in Barcelona published a review article on 
characterizations of national web domains, where they 
sketched an emerging field, which we would like to call 
national web studies. Of particular interest in the article 
is the distinction the authors made between studies in 
the 1990s on the characteristics of the web to those a 
decade later on national webs (Kehoe et al., 1999; Bae-
za-Yates et al., 2007). The term national web, we feel, 
is useful for capturing a historical shift in the study of 
the Internet, and especially how the web’s     location-
awareness repositions the Internet as object of study. A 
national web is one means of summing up the transi-
tion of the Internet from “cyberspace,” which     invokes 
a placeless space of email and packets, to the web of 
identifiable national domains (.de, .fr, .gr, etc.) as well 
as websites whose contents, advertisements and lan-
guage are matched to one’s location. The notion of the 
national web, we argue, is also worthwhile beyond the 
conceptual. It enables the study of the current condi-
tions of a web space demarcated along national lines, 
as Baeza-Yates and colleagues pointed out in compar-
ing one national web with another. As we would like to 
pursue here, it also may be useful for the study of con-
ditions not only of the online, but also of the ground. 
That is to say, national web studies are another example 
of country profiling.
 
Here, building upon the web characterization work, we 
provide an approach to the study of national webs that 
provides an overall rationale for their study (why study 
a national web) and engages a series of methodological 
debates (how to study a national web).Where the latter 
is concerned, we put forward an approach that is cogni-
zant of the multiplicity of user experiences of the web 
as well as the concomitant web data collection prac-
tices that users may actively or passively participate in. 
Search engines and other web information companies 
such as Alexa routinely collect data from users who 
search and use their toolbars, for example. Platforms 
where “crowds share” by posting and by rating are 
also data collection vessels and analysis machines. The 
outcomes of these data gathering and counting exer-
cises are often ranked lists of URLs, recommended to 
users. When location is added as a variable, the URL 
lists may be country or region specific. The same holds 
for language; namely, websites are served that are 
in whole or in part in a particular language. Thus, in 
practice one is able to speak of country-specific and/or 
language-specific webs organized by the data collected 
and analyzed by engines, platforms and other online 
devices. There is a caveat: users of these devices draw 
upon their own data, and are recursively provided a se-
lection of considered URLs. Such personalization may 
influence the country and language-specific URLs 
served however, to date the impact on search engine 
results appears to be minimal (Feuz et al., 2011). Con-
sequently, the effects of personalization are not treated 
here (Pariser, 2011).
 
We term the interaction between user and engine, the 
data that are collected, how they are analyzed, and ulti-
mately the URL recommendations that result, “device 
cultures.” In the case study below, we discuss a series 
of device cultures and the kinds of national webs they 
organize. We discuss a blogger’s, an advertiser’s, a 
surfer’s, a searcher’s and a crowd’s web, each formed 
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by the online devices and platforms that collect their 
data and ultimately purport to represent or provide in 
one manner or another a country-specific and/or lan-
guage-specific web. Put differently, we are making use 
of web devices that “go local,” i.e., devices that not 
only collect but serve web content territorially (which 
is usually nationally) or to a particular language group. 
In certain cases the two distinct meanings of going 
local are reconcilable; in other cases they are not. An 
engine may serve language-specific websites originat-
ing from inside the country as well as from outside the 
country in question. For example, in return for a query, 
the Bolivian “local domain Google” (Google.com.bo) 
may just as well serve results from Spain or Colombia 
as from Bolivia, with all being in Spanish. Thus when 
discussing the demise of cyberspace, and the rise of a 
location-aware web, there is a tension between two 
new dominant ways of interpreting the object of study: 
national webs versus language webs. We are sensitive 
to the tension between the two new manners of 
approaching the web after cyberspace, and are aware 
that “the local,” which as mentioned above is how 
Google terms its national domain engines, may refer to 
either a national web, a language web or both.
 
We also discuss approaches to demarcating a national 
web, including sampling procedures. We are particu-
larly interested in the fruitfulness of research outcomes 
from both keeping separate as well as triangulating 
the various parts of a national web—the blogger’s, 
the advertiser’s, etc. Are the URLs that are listed as 
“top blogs” by blog aggregators similar to the URLs 
that are listed as interesting by crowd-sourcing plat-
forms? Does the list of URLs with high traffic, and 
available advertising space for speakers of a particu-
lar language (i.e., Persian), resemble that of the most 
visited websites in a related country in question (Iran)? 
We conclude that keeping the parts of the web and the 
lists of URLs separate may be beneficial, as a national 
blogosphere may have different characteristics than a 
national crowd-sourced web.1
 
Where the overall rationale for studying a national web 
is concerned, it implies not only a critique of the web as 
placeless space, and as universalized; it is also a means 
to develop further analyses of relationships between 
web metrics and ground indicators. That is, another 
aim of this study is the consideration of digital methods 
1  The data for this study are online at the project website,                                   http://mappingiranonline.digitalmethods.net/.
to understand the significance of national web space. 
By digital methods we mean algorithms and other 
counting techniques whose inputs are digital objects, 
such as links and website response codes, and whose 
application pertains to, but ultimately moves beyond, 
the study of online culture only (Rogers, 2009). We dis-
cuss metrics for analyzing the health of a national web, 
such as its responsiveness, freshness and accessibility. 
We have experimented with such analyses before, seek-
ing to diagnose the condition of Iraq (in 2007, some 
four years into the Iraq War) by looking at “its web.” 
We found a broken web. Iraqi university websites were 
down, or had their domains poached and parked. Iraqi 
governmental sites were suffering from neglect, with 
the exception of the Ministry of Oil (oil.gov.iq), which 
was bilingual and regularly updated. In our brief foray 
into the state of Iraq via the Iraqi web, we sought to 
develop a series of metrics for diagnosing the health of 
a web, which are both conceptual as well as empirical.
Blocked yet blogging:    
The special case of Iran
The case study in question is Iran.2 It is in many respects 
a special case, not least because the term national web 
itself may be interpreted to mean the separate Internet-
like infrastructure that is being built there (Rhoads and 
Fassihi, 2011). It is also a special case for the scale 
and scope of Internet censorship undertaken by the 
state, which is coupled with the repression and silenc-
ing of voices critical of the regime. In other words, 
the Iranian web is experienced differently inside Iran 
than it is outside of Iran, which is of course the case 
for all countries where state Internet censorship occurs. 
It is also seemingly authored differently from outside 
than from inside Iran. As a consequence many Ira-
nians online, either site visitors or authors, whether 
inside or outside the country, need to cope with cen-
sorship. Inside the country, coping could mean being 
frustrated by it, and waiting for a friend or relative to 
bring news about a VPN or another means of getting 
around blockages. It could mean routinely circum-
venting censorship through VPNs, proxies, Google 
Reader and other means. Both inside and outside the 
country, coping may mean actively learning about (and 
consciously not using) banned words, and perhaps em-
2  According to the International Telecommunication Union, 13% of the 
Iranian population uses the Internet and 21% of Iranian households have In-
ternet access (2011). The marketing research reports an urban concentration 
of users, with “the vast majority (being) young, mostly 15 to 40” years of 
age (NetBina, 2010: 10). Figures on the Iranian diaspora are not available.
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ploying code words and misspellings instead. It could 
mean self-censorship. The degree to which Iranians 
online express themselves in times of censorship is of 
interest here. Dealing with online thuggery is another 
matter, which we are aware of, but do not cover in any 
detail. For example, one may be warned or pursued 
by the Iranian cyber army (Deibert and Rohozinski, 
2010). One copes, or protects oneself, through the 
careful selection of one piece of software or platform 
over another, based on which one provides safeguards 
and forms of anonymity. One may use wordpress.com 
for the ease with which one may choose a new email 
address as a login, or Friendfeed for the capacity to 
change  usernames. 
Having mentioned some of the reasons why it is a 
special case, we also would like to point out that certain 
general metrics such as site responsiveness and fresh-
ness may be put to good use when studying countries 
such as Iran. For example, if sites are blocked by the 
state, yet still responding and updated, one may have 
indications of a reading audience, both outside but also 
inside Iran. One may have indications of widespread 
censorship circumvention, as we report. Here in partic-
ular the retention of the separate webs in our sampling 
procedure is beneficial. That is, the Iranian blogo-
sphere, or the Iranian bloggers read through Google 
Reader and indexed by Likekhor (a website that rates 
websites by ‘likes’), are roundly blocked by the state, 
yet remain blogging. “Blocked yet blogging” may be 
the catchphrase for at least certain vital parts of the 
 Iranian web.
 
Perhaps not often recognized as such, national webs 
are nevertheless routinely created. It may be said that 
national webs come into being through the advent of 
geo-location technology, whereby national (or lan-
guage) versions of web applications (such as Google) 
are served nationally (Google.gr for Greece) together 
with the advertisements targeted to locals and infor-
mation in compliance with national laws (Goldsmith 
and Wu, 2006; Schmidt, 2009). Notably, it is the search 
engine whose mission statement is universal access 
that is at the forefront of the rise of the national and 
the demise of placelessness (Google, 2011a). Eric 
Schmidt, Google’s former chief executive officer, has 
explained that at Google.com there is information de-
livered that is legal in the United States, and illegal in 
other countries. Google asserts that when a result is on 
Google.com it is essentially controlled by Google U.S. 
and under jurisdiction of U.S. law. Google thus offers 
local search engines that are compliant with local laws. 
One of the earliest and most commonly used exam-
ples by Google executives (and by the search engine 
industry more generally) is that pro-Nazi material is 
illegal in Germany (and France), and Google omits 
those websites in their local domain search engines, 
Google.de and Google.fr (Schmidt, 2009; Whetstone, 
2010). Google also abides by national youth protection 
laws, for instance in Korea by enabling Safe Search 
by default. In such cases, Google’s results page states 
the number of returns that have been removed for legal 
reasons (Whetstone, 2010). Google.cn is the most well-
known as well as controversial instance of  localization, 
whereby Google’s Chinese engine filtered results drasti-
cally. It took a novel approach in 2010  by redirecting 
users of Google.cn (China) to   Google.com.hk (Hong 
Kong), where Google does not filter, according to the 
company (Drummond, 2010a; Drummond, 2010b).
 
There is, of course, further literature to draw upon 
when studying national webs, from the pioneering eth-
nographic study of the national web of Trinidad and 
Tobago, where not global but rather Trini culture is 
performed, to well-known works on media as organiz-
ing national sentiment and community more generally 
(Higson, 1989; Anderson, 1991; Miller and Slater, 
2000; Ginsburg et al., 2002). In policy studies, too, na-
tional webs, or portions of them, are increasingly 
“mapped” to inform debates about the extent to which 
the web, and especially the blogosphere, organizes 
voice (Kelly and Etling, 2008; Etling et al., 2010). Of 
interest is the related work that seeks to build tools to 
circumvent censorship so that voice is still heard 
(Glanz and Markoff, 2011; Roberts et al., 2011). In li-
brary science, national webs are routinely constructed 
by national  libraries and other national archiving proj-
ects, which also have considered how to define such a 
web (Arvidson and Lettenström, 1998; Arms et al., 
2001; Abiteboul et al., 2002; Koerbin, 2004). There are 
variously sized national web archives. Countries that 
have legal deposit legislation for web content as well 
as  books (such as Denmark) tend to have notably 
larger web archives than the countries that do not (such 
as the Netherlands) (PADI, n.d.; Lasfargues et al., 
2008).
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Defining national websites, 
and the implications for 
national web capture
Archivists’ definitions of national webs and national 
websites are of special interest in our undertaking. How 
do national libraries define national webs and web-
sites? What may we learn from their definitional work? 
For example, the Royal Library of the Netherlands, 
following similar definitions of a national website from 
archiving projects in other European countries, defines 
a website as “Dutch” if it meets one or more of the fol-
lowing tests.
What is a “Dutch website”? It is a Dutch website, if it 
is:
a)  Dutch language, and registered in the 
 Netherlands;
b)  Any language, and registered in the 
 Netherlands;
c) Dutch language, registered outside the 
 Netherlands; or
d)  Any language, registered outside the 
 Netherlands, with subject matter related 
 to the Netherlands (Weltevrede, 2009).
 
The above scheme for what constitutes a national 
website, or at least one deemed relevant for a national 
archiving context, has consequences for their collec-
tion. Here in the first instance we would like to discuss 
how a definition affects the collection technique, auto-
mated or by hand. If one were to begin with sites from 
the national domain (.nl), those sites in Dutch (and 
ones in other languages) may be automatically detect-
ed with software, and in the collection procedure, one 
would remove from the list .be sites (from Belgium, 
where Dutch, or Flemish, is also spoken), unless they 
treated Dutch subject matters. (Dutch national web 
archive users likely would be surprised to come upon 
Belgian websites stored in it for whatever reason!) 
The Royal Library’s could be described, however, as 
an editorial approach, for especially websites related 
to Dutch subject matters and websites in Dutch but 
registered outside of the Netherlands (outside of .nl) 
pose particular challenges to automation, and work-
ing at scale. As a research practice, one would not be 
able to automate the detection and capturing of those 
sites; one would more likely create a list of them, be-
fore routinely capturing them over time. In the national 
web characterization studies, reviewed by Baeza-Yates 
in 2007 and discussed at the outset, the national do-
main (known as the country code top-level domain, or 
ccTLD) is the  organizing entity. In practice, however, 
many countries (or nationals) use URLs outside of their 
national domains, such as .com, .net and .org. As we 
note below, for Iran, sites with the .ir ccTLD in fact 
may not be the preferred starting points for demarcat-
ing a national Iranian web. As a case in point, in our 
data the percentage of .ir sites that is blocked is very 
low, compared to .com’s, for example. Thus .ir seems 
to have characteristics that differ from other sites au-
thored and/or read by Iranians.
 
In order to describe the considerations an analyst may 
have when beginning to demarcate a national web, and 
at the same time to direct these thoughts to the speci-
ficity of Iran, we first surveyed a selection of Iranian 
bloggers about the “Iranian web,” and particularly the 
very ideas of an Iranian website as well as a national 
web.
 
We are particularly interested in contrasting defini-
tions of a national web that are “principled” with those 
based on device cultures. By principled we mean a 
priori definitions of what constitutes a national web 
and a national website, such as the archivist’s above. 
By device cultures we mean the webs that are formed 
by collecting and analyzing user data, and outputting 
leading sites of a country and/or language. We men-
tioned above some of the consequences of demarcating 
a national web when national websites of interest to 
archiving are based on formalist properties of their 
content. It becomes difficult to make a collection at any 
scale.
 
In preliminary research about the very notion of an Ira-
nian web, a small survey, undertaken by a New Media 
M.A. student at the University of Amsterdam, was made 
of Iranian bloggers using Google Reader (Gooder) in 
the student’s Gooder network (n=141) (Zarrinbakhsh, 
2011). A variety of definitions of a national web were 
put forward, and the respondents were asked to choose 
which definition was best suited. (They could choose 
multiple answers.) From the beginning, the question 
was met with suspicion, as the term itself was seen 
as a possible ruse by the Iranian government to cre-
ate its own Internet, and further isolate the country and 
the people, as the student reported. In comments on 
the question, it was written that the Internet is a “free 
sphere” and ideas of a national web would “limit” such 
freedom. 
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The questions read as follows: What is an “Iranian 
website”? It is an Iranian website, if it is:
a) Only in the Persian language
b)  In Persian and other languages (and dialects) 
spoken in Iran
c) Authored by Iranians
d) Related to Iranian issues
e) Accessed by Iranians
f) National domain (.ir)
g) Returned by Google
 
Note first the expansion of considerations for what 
would constitute a national web beyond what we have 
related so far, both in national domain characterization 
studies but also in the case of the constitution of the 
Dutch web by the Royal Library. In particular, sites 
accessed by Iranians and those returned by Google are 
newly added candidate constructs of an Iranian web, 
where the former treats the Iranian web like a tradi-
tional media consumption survey: Which sites are most 
visited? The last question about Google’s relationship 
with the Iranian web is more ambiguous. Google could 
be equated with the web generally, as its entry point. 
Or, one could find the Iranian web with Google. 
 
As a whole, twelve percent believed that only Per-
sian websites could be considered national websites. 
Thirty-one percent checked the box for Persian web-
sites and other languages and dialects spoken in Iran. 
Forty-five percent thought that when Iranians produce 
the content, it could be counted in the area of a na-
tional web. Twenty-nine percent were of the opinion 
that everything related to Iranian issues is in the area 
of the Iranian national web. Nineteen percent were of 
the opinion that the websites accessed by Iranians show 
their national web. It should be noted that some people 
were very much opposed to this choice; they men-
tioned that every website can be accessed by anyone, 
so this item seems to be ill conceived.  Four percent of 
the total respondents chose websites with the Iranian 
domain (.ir), implying that national web studies relying 
on the domain only would prove unpopular. Nine per-
cent thought that websites that appear in Google search 
results make up the (Iranian national) web.
 
Finally, in a follow-up question addressing the is-
sue of any difference between writing from inside or 
outside the country, approximately one-third of the re-
spondents seemed to agree with the communications 
scholar, Gholam Khiabany:
If Iranian blogs are defined in terms of lan-
guage, this means omission of a large number 
of Iranian bloggers who write in other lan-
guages, most notably English, while including 
a number of bloggers from Afghanistan or 
Tajikistan who write in Persian. Focusing on 
Iranian bloggers writing inside the country 
also leads to excluding a large number of Ira-
nian bloggers writing in Persian outside Iran 
(2007:565).
 
On the basis of these survey findings, and extend-
ing Khiabany’s thought, the analyst concluded that a 
 national web could be defined as one that is authored 
by Iranians, no matter their location or language in 
which they write, and no matter the subject matter. 
Such a definition of the national web appears to include 
sites with content authored by Iranians outside of Iran 
in languages other than Persian, on issues that may not 
be related to Iranian affairs. This is a case whereby the 
definition makes it nearly impossible to demarcate an 
Iranian web! In any case, detecting sites authored by 
Iranians outside of Iran in languages other than Persian 
would require manual work. It may be worth noting 
that the definition adhered to by the Royal Library of 
the Netherlands also required manual work, but did not 
expand its definition of Dutch sites to sites authored 
by Dutch people abroad in languages other than Dutch, 
unless the subject matter was Dutch-related.
 
Having considered and discussed what we have termed 
principled approaches to defining national websites 
and webs, we instead chose to analyze the outputs of 
devices, which we come to again in more detail shortly. 
That is, methodologically, we do not begin with a prio-
ri definitions of what constitutes an Iranian website, or 
the Iranian web, however fascinating in a formalistic 
and ontological sense. Rather, as we explain and even-
tually defend, we rely upon the URL recommendations 
made by dominant web devices and platforms, which 
through different algorithms and logics are deemed 
relevant for a specific country and/or language.
 
Our contribution to national web studies informs 
the literature on national web characterization, as 
discussed in the opening, as well as on policy studies 
(and political science) about the organization of voice 
online. It also contributes to media theory and web 
studies by putting forward the national web as object 
of study. The overall approach is not only conceptual 
but also empirical, in that we seek properties of na-
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tional web spaces that are indicators of conditions on 
the ground. Such properties could be how responsive a 
national web is at any given time, and how accessible. 
Are responsive sites also fresh, or recently updated? 
Are sites that are blocked still responsive and fresh? 
We are also interested in more than the technical web 
data sets, and how they may be repurposed for social 
study. As alluded to already, for Iran in particular the 
content of websites is carefully monitored by the state; 
websites may be blocked and website authors may be 
pursued. In the following, we put forward an approach 
to demarcating a national web, in order to study its cur-
rent conditions, including analysis of changing degrees 
of expression and voice (2009-2011).
Demarcating the Iranian web:
Studying the outputs of device
cultures
The purpose of the research is to demarcate a nominal 
Iranian web, and analyze its condition, thereby pro-
viding indications of the situation on the ground. By 
nominal web we mean one that is predicated on the 
means by which it is organized by online devices and 
platforms as well as retrieved, both by the user and by 
the analyst. Here we have chosen to demarcate an Irani-
an web through multiple, dominant online approaches 
for indexing and ordering that “go local,” and privilege 
language, location and audience, broadly speaking. 
Working in July 2011, we found that the web given 
by three crowd-sourcing platforms aimed at an Iranian 
audience differs from that yielded by a marketing tool 
for Persian-language advertisers, a surfer pathway ag-
gregator of users in Iran, and a search engine delivering 
.ir sites as well as other top-level domain sites from the 
“region,” even though each purports in some general 
or specific sense to provide the Iranian web. Ultimate-
ly we have chosen to write about the Iranian webs in 
the multiple, and discuss each web’s characteristics. 
We thereby addressed an issue faced by the analyst 
when formulating where to start collecting URLs, be 
it in terms of compiling seed URLs to crawl, stringing 
together keywords and operators to form a query, con-
sulting lists of top blogs by inlink count, top URLs by 
rating or top websites by hit count, etc. For our analysis 
we selected the outputs of the well-known aggregators 
of Iranian or Persian-language websites, in a sense not 
choosing one starting point, but retaining them all—or 
at least a number of significant ones. 
We also took decisions with respect to dealing with 
the idea that a sample of the Iranian web would fol-
low (only) from knowledge of its population. As we 
discuss, in the national web research area one may be 
confronted by expectations of knowing the population 
of a web (in terms of the number of websites, and some 
categorization of their types), and being able to make a 
sample from it and from its types. In thinking through 
such an undertaking, one may port scan the Iranian 
IP ranges and establish whether IP addresses respond 
to the standard HTTP and HTTPS ports 80, 8080, 
or 443. One would count how many web servers are 
active within a specific IP range, and in a second step 
roughly estimate the number of domains. Alternative-
ly, one may consider approaching the Iranian Internet 
authority or Iranian ISPs for their data. Or, one could 
crawl a seed list of URLs, or multiple lists, in snowball 
techniques, and subsequently sift the large catch by lan-
guage-detection software and/or whois lookups. When 
one begins to rely on web services that have ceilings or 
have issues with spammers and scrapers (which is most 
if not all of them), then the challenges of (relatively) 
big online data become apparent. One is unable to run 
batch  queries without permission from corporate re-
search labs, Internet administrative bodies and  others. 
Just when it is becoming interesting, the research focus 
turns to the administrative, legal and social engineer-
ing arenas, bringing everything to a standstill. Research 
that gains the access, and finishes the large collecting 
and sifting project, become great achievements in 
themselves. Whilst we have undertaken one medium-
scale scraping and querying exercise for this research 
project, we largely avoid the techno-administrative 
arena we refer to above, and instead seek to make use 
of what is available to web users. We make a conscious 
choice in favor of relatively small data.
 
Furthermore, we would like to make a case for a 
method to demarcate a national web (or “webs”) that 
is sensitive to the variety of ways one enters web space 
by belonging to particular device cultures, which we 
largely equate with engine and platform operations, 
instead of in an ethnographic sense (where an object 
may have a spirit, for example). Generally, we intro-
duce national web demarcation methods that repurpose 
web devices that not only “go local,” but also capture 
device cultures. In short, we are interested in capturing 
national device cultures. Repurposing web devices has 
two methodological advantages. First, popular devices 
may be viewed as mediating and quantifying specific 
usage. The devices do so by recursively soliciting user 
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participation in content production and evaluation. 
They calculate the most relevant websites by aggregat-
ing links, clicks, views and votes, thereby outputting 
collectively privileged sources. Second, the defini-
tion of an Iranian web is outsourced to the big data 
methodology used by devices to order content, which 
combines algorithmic techniques with large-scale user 
participation. Relatively small data sets are obtained 
from the output of these big data devices. Put differ-
ently, the repurposing of web devices is both a strategy 
for the small data researcher to sample from a big data 
set as well as a means to have samples that represent 
specific outlooks on how to organize and order web 
content, as we explain in our discussion of the privileg-
ing of hits, links, location, likes and other measures by 
the platforms and devices under study.
 
In the analyses, we wish to chart language and other 
formal features that are in each Iranian web. More 
conceptually, in our particular approach to nation-
al web studies, we also would like to discuss which 
portions of the web are healthy, in the sense of (still) 
online and active, and which are broken, in the sense 
of  unresponsive. Additionally, we are interested in the 
extent to which each is censored or filtered by the state, 
and whether there is a relationship between responsive 
(and fresh) websites and filtered websites. In order to 
pursue the question of whether censorship kills con-
tent, which we have formulated in a previous (and 
preliminary) project on the Tunisian web (prior to the 
“Arab Spring” of 2011), we developed means to chart 
changes to a special part of the Iranian web over time. 
Here we use time-series data from Balatarin, a leading 
crowd-sourced platform which we scraped, comparing 
the significant URLs voted up around the presidential 
elections in 2009, with those of the same time peri-
od in 2010 and 2011. First we ran the hosts through 
proxies in Iran so as to check for indications of block-
ing. Generally we found that Balatarin’s collection of 
URLs is particularly susceptible to blocking. We also 
analyzed the use of particular words (“fiery language”), 
in order to make findings about voice online in times 
of  suppression and repression. We are particularly 
interested in the relationship between the use of that 
language on websites and the blocking of those same 
sites. Do the authors of the webpages continue to use 
language that would have their sites blocked? Gener-
ally, we discuss our findings in terms of the strength, 
clarity and volume of voice, which we describe. Prior 
to reporting on the longitudinal analyses, first, in the 
following, the indexing and ordering mechanisms of 
the web platforms and devices relevant to the Iranian 
space are described. The data culled from these plat-
forms and engines are employed to characterize the 
web types on offer.
Device cultures: How websites 
are valued and ranked
The early web was organized by amateur as well as 
professional link list makers, who took on the mantle 
of a librarian or specimen collector, and made direc-
tories of websites, organized by category. Professional 
or “pro-am” website categorization by topic remains, 
in the larger-scale directories such as Yahoo! as well 
as in smaller-scale collections, though the practice 
arguably has declined in the face of the other methods 
(which we describe here) that have become more and 
more settled as dominant approaches online for valuing 
websites (Deuze, 2007; Bruns, 2008). These approach-
es of valuing websites we couch in technical as well 
as politico-economic terms as the “hit economy,” “link 
economy,” “geoweb,” “crowd-sourcing,” and the “like 
economy,” which highlights what is counted, by whom 
and/or where. Crowd-sourcing, a term coined by the 
Internet trade press that derives from the practice of 
outsourcing, also has been described as the “worker-
bee economy,” where both the so-called wisdom but 
also the labor of the crowd pollinates the beneficiary, 
often a Web 2.0 company or service (Howe, 2006; 
Moulier-Boutang, 2008). The other term we employ, 
the geoweb or locative web, has less of the connotation 
of a particular kind of economy, yet contains the means 
by which sites are sourced.
 
The hit economy, once exemplified by the hit counter 
on early websites, ranks sites by the number of hits 
or impressions, where unique visitors count. For such 
a view we have chosen DoubleClick Ad Planner by 
Google (referred to here as Google Ad Planner), which 
is a service that ranks sites by audience for the purposes 
of advertisers. Whilst “Iran” is not among the countries 
listed (which likely owes to a combination of the lack of 
a .ir local domain Google as well as the U.S. economic 
sanctions against Iran), Persian-speaking is among the 
site type categories in the available audience  analytics. 
Thus one Iranian web would be comprised of those 
sites that reach a Persian-speaking audience, as collect-
ed and ranked by Google Ad Planner. Using the options 
available, 1,500 unique hosts for a Persian-speaking 
 audience were collected from Google Ad Planner. 
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The “link economy” is a term that describes the rise 
of PageRank and other algorithms that value links 
(Rogers, 2002). It also captures a shift in URL ranking 
logics away from an advertiser’s model (hit-counting) 
to a more bibliographic or scientometric manner of 
thinking (citation or link-counting). The term is used 
to characterize Google Web Search, however, much of 
the other main component to the algorithm apart from 
link-counting is user click-throughs. Searching Google 
for .ir sites (including .ir’s second level domains) as 
well as Iranian sites in generic top-level domains in 
Google’s regional search, yielded some 3,500 hosts.3 
 
Alexa, like other companies offering browser toolbars, 
collects user location data such as a postal code upon 
registration, and once the toolbar is installed, tracks 
websites visited by the user (see Figure 1). It thereby 
keeps records of the sites most visited by user location. 
Alexa furnishes a list of the top 500 sites visited by 
users in Iran. 
Crowd-sourced sites such as the most well-known 
(Balatarin) and its emulators (Donbaleh and Sabz-
link) require registration before the user may suggest 
a link, which is then voted upon by other registered 
users. Those URLs with the most votes rise to the top. 
For this exercise, we collected approximately 1,100 
different hosts from Balatarin, 2,850 from Donbaleh 
and 2,750 from Sabzlink.4 In the following analyses we 
grouped the two crowd-sourcing platforms Donbaleh 
and Sabzlink, for they share the device culture (crowd-
sourcing). Together they resulted in 4,579 unique hosts. 
We treated the other crowd-sourcing platform, Balata-
rin, separately. The special treatment arises from its 
status as a highly significant Iranian website. 
Launched in 2006, Balatarin is considered the first 
Web 2.0 site in Persian, and has been recognized as 
one of the most popular Persian websites in 2007 and 
3  Google.com’s web search was chosen for its dominance in Iran among 
users of search engingooes. Data from 2010 list search engine market shares 
in Iran as follows: Google 90.78%, Yahoo 4.97%, Bing 3.64%, Ask Jeeves 
0.46%, AOL 0.07% (MVF Global, 2010). Another marketing research firm 
lists 2011 market shares in Iran as Google 87.15%, Yahoo 7.27%, Bing 
4.16%, Ask 0.70%, AOL 0.12% and Lycos 0.01% (Net Applications, 2011). 
According to Alexa in October 2011, Google.com is the most visited site in 
Iran, followed by Yahoo.com. We employed site queries in Google.com for 
the top level (site:.ir) as well as the second level domains (e.g., site:.co.ir), 
and concatenated the results. The query technique did not allow for the re-
directing to a local domain oogle. Because cookies had not been retained, it 
also did not allow for the personalization of the results. 
4  In order to compare the different platforms we chose to compare hosts 
instead of full URLs. That is, for Balatarin, we harvested all the URLs listed 
on the 150 pages of “hot” links, resulting in 1102 unique hosts.
2008 (Wikipedia, 2011). It also has been pivotal for the 
Green Movement in the opposition before and after 
the Iranian presidential elections in 2009 (Iran Media 
Program, 2010). The recognition of Balatarin as a plat-
form for the opposition also provides the opportunity 
to employ it as a barometer in studying the continu-
ing strength, clarity and volume of that voice. Do the 
websites that are recommended on Balatarin continue 
to express themselves critically, or have they discon-
tinued the use of language critical of the regime? By 
strength of voice, we examine the continued use of 
the words. To study clarity, we examine whether the 
words they choose are fiery and side-taking or coded. 
Volume is whether there are more and more voices that 
are using the words: Is the chorus (so to speak) grow-
ing louder?
 
The introduction of the like button and other social 
counters in social media has brought with it what one 
may term the “like economy,” which values content 
based on social button activity (Gerlitz and Helmond, 
2011). Likekhor, as the name suggests, ranks websites 
by likes; the likes are tallied from Google Reader users 
who have registered with Likekhor. Google Reader, or 
Gooder (as some Iranian users call it), is of particular 
interest because through it one has been able to read the 
contents of websites that are otherwise filtered by the 
state. Google Reader thus effectively acts as a proxy 
to access filtered websites. At Likekhor the focus is on 
blogs, pointing up a relationship between Google Read-
er users and bloggers, or blog readers. From Likekhor 
we extracted a list of 2,600 hosts, which are collected 
from a page where all blogs on Likekhor are listed.
Figure 1: Alexa toolbar installation and registration 
process, with field for user’s postal code, August 2011.
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ly, device cultures. Google Ad Planner,  Alexa, Google 
Web Search,  Likekhor (Google Reader) as well as the 
crowd-sourcing platforms (Donbaleh, Sabzlink and 
 Balatarin) make available (either through query re-
sults or dynamically-generated listings) websites that 
are relevant for Iranians and Persian speakers. In our 
case, with the exception of the searcher’s web (gained 
through .ir and generic TLD queries in Google’s region 
search), the percentages of .ir sites among the signifi-
cant hosts outputted by the devices are relatively low 
(see Table 1). The crowd-sourced web references the 
fewest .ir sites at just over 10 percent, whilst that of 
both the advertiser’s as well as the geoweb, or web 
of surfers in Iran, has the highest percentage at about 
25 percent. As noted earlier, the .ir sites in our overall 
collection of URLs are much less likely to be blocked 
than the .com sites. Of the websites that are tested and 
found blocked from inside Iran, 80 percent are .com, 
followed by .net with 6 percent and .org with 4 percent. 
The ccTLD .ir has 3 percent of all censored hosts.
 
Having reviewed how samples are generally made, 
Baeza-Yates and colleagues compared the ten national 
web studies, in order to arrive at a core set of  measures 
that are shared across many of them (see Table 2). 
Our characterization of the Iranian web (or webs) has 
a particular point of departure that benefits from the 
metrics on offer. In reference to the metrics in Table 
2, in the category of content our project shares inter-
est in language, page age and domain analysis (albeit 
top-level), and in the category of technology, relies on 
HTTP response codes. The codes yield what we refer to 
as “responsiveness,” which we consider a basic health 
metric, together with page age, the freshness measure. 
There are other metrics that we do not employ, though 
we would like to mention how to do so. Brokenness 
could be gleaned from link validators, where it would 
refer to broken links on a site. Additionally, establish-
Thus, in July 2011, we collected more than 10,000 
unique hosts through platforms and devices significant 
to  Iranian users (Google Reader, Google Web Search 
and the crowd-sourcing platforms) and two that pro-
vide ranked lists of Iranian or Persian-speaking sites 
(Alexa and Google Ad Planner) on the basis of data 
collected from users located in Iran (Alexa) or from 
Persian-writing users (Google Ad Planner). We will 
characterize these Iranian webs individually as well as 
collectively. We have chosen not to triangulate them, 
for very few websites recur across them.
Analyzing the characteristics 
of the Iranian web: Language 
and responsiveness
One area of research that we build upon is web char-
acterization studies, where one of the main difficulties 
repeatedly discussed is how to obtain a representative 
sample of a national web or other web types. Accord-
ing to Baeza-Yates and colleagues, the three common 
types of sampling techniques used in web character-
ization studies are “complete crawls of a single web 
site, random samples from the whole web, and large 
samples from specific communities” (2007: 1). For 
national webs, which the authors consider to be specif-
ic communities, the list is comprised of websites with 
the same ccTLD (country code top-level domain). For 
many national webs, however, such delimiting would 
be too partial, certainly for countries where generic top-
level domain usage is prevalent. Our approach seeks to 
retain the .com’s, .org’s, .net’s, etc. when deemed  rel-
evant for Iranians and Persian-speakers by the  devices 
and platforms upon which we rely.
 
To the sampling techniques described above, we thus 
would like to add a fourth type which could be called 
multiple aggregator site scraping, or more conceptual-
Table 1: Percentage of .ir sites in top websites collected from device cultures 
relevant to Iranians and Persian-speakers, July 2011.
Percentage Iranian web Absolute numbers
25% Alexa (Geoweb) 126 of 496 hosts
24% Google Ad Planner (Advertiser’s) 370 of 1,525 hosts
16% Likekhor (Blogger’s) 397 of 2,541 hosts
12% Donbaleh/Sabzlink (Crowd-sourced) 535 of 4,579 hosts
11% Balatarin (Crowd-sourced) 116 of 1,102 hosts
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ing whether websites are “parked” or “hacked” may 
serve as measures of abandonment by previous owners. 
Compared against proxy data, parked or abandoned 
site analysis may be used to make claims about the 
 effectiveness of censorship, or suppression of voice. 
Fitness could refer to the “validity” of code, or correct 
implementation; Baeza-Yates and colleagues refer to 
site structure, and its “correctness” for a crawler. Other 
metric types more in the realm of political economy 
that are of interest to us in expanded undertakings are 
available. For example, media, document and image 
formats could give us an indication of the extent to 
which a national web is proprietary, which from certain 
perspectives is a health issue.
The Iranian web and its      
languages
One basic metric seeks to measure the composition of 
languages in the Iranian web (see Figure 2). Persian 
is of course the official language in Iran; the Unicode 
system incorporated Persian script in 2001, and it can 
be detected (Amir-Ebrahimi, 2008). For language 
 detection of websites we built a custom tool that makes 
use of alchemyAPI’s language detection functional-
ity, and is able to detect Persian as well as the other 
languages, though not all languages spoken in Iran, as 
we relate.5 In a second step, the results are manually 
checked.6 Two out of three sites in the Iranian web, 
5  The language auto-detection functionality is provided by alchemyAPI, 
which for academic researchers allows 30,000 queries per day. The tool is at 
http://www.alchemyapi.com/api/lang 
6  We manually checked the results which returned sites as English or un-
known, and corrected any errors. We have not explored further why dual-
language sites are considered as one particular language by alchemyAPI. 
We also would consider using Google Translate as a language detector. The 
in total, are in Persian; English is second with one of 
five. Of interest are the proportions of Persian used in 
the various webs. The results show that the blogger’s 
space, Likekhor, is on top with 91 percent of the sourc-
es in Persian, followed by Alexa’s Iran-based surfer’s 
web with 83 percent and the crowd-sourced web with 
73 percent. At the bottom are the advertiser’s web with 
62 percent, and Google Web Search with 52 percent. 
Balatarin, the special case, has 75 percent in Persian. 
Thus there is significant difference between the webs, 
including,  notably, a Persian-dominant blogosphere (if 
the Likekhor list may serve as a short-hand reference 
to such).7
Here we can begin to discuss the kinds of webs that 
one were to capture and analyze if one were to define 
the Iranian web or an Iranian website a priori, and seek 
it according to a formal definition, a subject matter 
raised earlier with respect to the web archivist’s formal 
conditions of a national website (in the Dutch example) 
as well as the survey respondents’ ideas of a national 
web (for Iran). The blogosphere and to a slightly lesser 
extent the geoweb (based on surfers in Iran) are most 
closely related to ideas of an Iranian web as Persian-
speaking only, though in that case between them there 
still would be an average of more than 10 percent of 
the non-Persian websites to be reckoned with. The 
Iranian webs with larger percentages of non-Persian 
sites are the advertiser’s as well as the regional web 
‘unknown’ tags in the cloud indicate that neither the language detection tool 
nor the researcher was able to determine the language, for in most cases the 
site was no longer online.
7  Additionally, the Iranian webs show various degrees of language distribu-
tion, with Alexa being the least diverse with six languages and Google Web 
Search the most with 36 languages. 
Table 2: Metrics commonly used in national web characterization studies according to Baeza-Yates et al., 2007. 
Bold indicates metrics used in this study, but we analyze the top-level domain rather than the second-level          
domain.
Content Link Technology
Language Degree URL length
Page size Ranking HTTP response code
Page age Web structure Media and document formats
Pages per site  Image formats
Sites & pages per domain  Sites that cannot be crawled correctly
Second-level domain  Web server software
  Programming languages for dynamic pages
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(from Google’s advanced search region option). The 
advertiser’s is the web accessed by Persian speakers as 
detected by the signals Google compiles on its users 
and the content it indexes (Google Ad Planner). Both 
have far higher percentages of non-Persian sites, espe-
cially English, though we did not attempt to investigate 
whether these sites are authored by Iranians, or concern 
Iranian affairs, however that may be defined. 
There is another web one could conceive of a priori, 
which also would have implications for the method by 
which one would construct the object of study. Being 
all-inclusive in terms of the languages spoken in Iran 
(Armenian, Assyrian Neo-Aramaic, Azeri, Kurdish, 
Lori, Balochi, Gilaki, Mazandarani, Arabic and Turk-
men) has consequences for the capturing techniques; 
of the secondary languages spoken in Iran, the lan-
guage detection tool employed in this study detects 
only Armenian, Arabic and Azeri, and not Assyrian 
Neo-Aramaic, Kurdish, Lori, Balochi, Gilaki, Mazan-
darani or Turkmen. To compile such sites, one would 
rely on specialists’ link lists, though we did not pursue 
the  matter any further.
The Iranian web and              
responsiveness
To analyze the responsiveness of the Iranian webs 
we retrieved the HTTP response status codes (of the 
some 10,000 unique hosts) from the Netherlands with a 
custom-built tool. The inputs to the tool are the lists of 
hosts per web that previously were collected. Analyz-
ing the results returned by the response code tool, we 
found that there are eight commonly returned codes in 
the Iranian web spaces (see Figure 3).8 The 400 class 
of status codes indicates that the client has erred; “404 
not found” (which means that the content is no lon-
ger available) is considered the strongest indication 
of unresponsiveness. “400 bad request” means that 
there was an error in the syntax, and “403 forbidden” 
indicates that the server is refusing to respond.  Com-
monly returned response codes besides the “200 OK” 
status (standard successful HTTP response) are two 
redirecting response codes: “301 moved permanently” 
and “302 found.” Redirecting is not necessarily an in-
dication of unresponsiveness, and can have a range of 
reasons, including forwarding multiple domain names 
to the same location, redirecting short aliases to longer 
8  The http status codes are explained on the dedicated Wikipedia entry, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_HTTP_status_codes (accessed 14 July 
2011).
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Figure 2: The distribution of languages on the Iranian web, August 2011. Graphic by the Digital Methods 
Initiative, Amsterdam.
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URLs, or moving a site to a new domain.9 It also may 
be an indication of a parked website. However, redi-
rects also may be “soft 404” messages to hide broken 
links (Yossef et al., 2004). In the current study, both 
301 and 302 were followed if a location header was re-
turned, which mostly resolved in 200 and 404 response 
codes. “0 connection problem” indicates that the tool 
was unable to connect to the server; the server may no 
longer exist, or it may mean that that the site did not 
respond within 60 seconds.
The findings of this portion of the study indicate, first, 
that the Iranian webs are relatively healthy overall. 
The crowd-sourcing webs of Donbaleh/Sabzlink and 
Balatarin have 92 and 94 percent of the sites resolv-
ing, respectively. The advertiser’s space, followed by 
the blogger’s space, delivered by Google Reader us-
ers, have the cleanest bills of health, with 96 and 95 
9  URL redirection is explained on the dedicated Wikipedia entry, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/URL_redirection (accessed 14 July 2011).
percent of the websites resolving. Thus the vibrancy 
of the (Persian-language) advertiser’s space and the 
 blogosphere as well as the crowd-sourced webs is a 
finding. 
The Iranian web and Internet 
censorship
Arguably, web devices are among the most well-in-
formed censorship monitoring instruments. Search 
engines and platforms receive requests for deleting 
content—either specific URLs, specific queries or 
more general instructions—thereby inviting the cre-
ation of an ongoing blacklist as well as a censorship 
index. For example, it has been reported that to adhere 
to Chinese government censorship instructions (prior 
to the redirect to .com.hk), Google engineers “set up a 
computer inside China and programmed it to try to ac-
cess websites outside the country, one after another. If 
a site was blocked by the firewall, it meant the govern-
ment regarded it as illicit so it became part of Google’s 
Crowd-sourced web
(Balatarin)
Surfer’s geoweb
(Alexa)
Advertiser's web
(Google Ad Planner)
Searcher's web
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Figure 3: The health of the Iranian webs measured by HTTP response codes in the Netherlands, August 
2011. Graphic by the Digital Methods Initiative, Amsterdam.
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blacklist” (Thompson, 2006). In the case of the Iranian 
web, which is among the most aggressively censored 
webs in the world, there are no reported requests for 
removal from the government (Open Net Initiative, 
2009; Google, 2011b). The graph in Figure 4, however, 
shows how Iranian traffic to YouTube increased in the 
run-up to the presidential elections in June 2009, be-
fore coming to an almost complete standstill one day 
after. The question of interest in this study is to what 
extent blocking important sites has had on the health 
of the Iranian webs. In the following, the Iranian webs 
collected are checked for availability inside Iran by us-
ing proxies. Subsequently, these findings are compared 
against the basic health measures, responsiveness and 
freshness. As mentioned above, one of the more re-
markable findings is that a large portion of the Iranian 
blogs is blocked, yet continues to respond, and is fresh.
 
The Censorship Explorer tool, which we have made 
available at http://tools.digitalmethods.net/beta/prox-
ies/, lists (fresh) proxies by country, and may be used 
to check for censored websites. The tool returns web-
site response codes, or loads the actual websites in 
the browser, as if you were in the chosen country in 
question. As a starting point in the censorship research 
procedure, one often checks website responsiveness in 
a country that is not known to censor (Iranian) web-
sites (in this case, the Netherlands). Subsequently, one 
runs lists of hosts through proxies in Iran, and logs the 
response codes. If the response code is 403 forbidden, 
while the response code is 200 OK when connected 
from the Netherlands, it is understood as a strong in-
dication that a site is blocked.10 Although testing via 
proxies does not guarantee a replication of the average 
user experience, response code checks through proxies 
give indications of specific types of Internet censor-
ship, i.e., URL and IP blocking through techniques 
such as TCP/IP header filtering, TCP/IP content filter-
ing and HTTP proxy filtering (Murdoch and Anderson, 
2008). (There are other known filtering techniques that 
are more accurately detected by other means, includ-
ing DNS tampering and partial content filtering.) Often 
multiple proxies are used, allowing the researcher to tri-
angulate proxy results and increase the trustworthiness 
of the results. For example, “0 Connection Problem” 
may be a proxy problem, but may just as well be that 
the censors return an RST (reset)  package, which re-
sets the connection, effectively dropping it (Villeneuve, 
2006). 
10    Typically, when an Iranian proxy returns 403 forbidden for a particular site, 
one is presented with an iframe loading http://10.10.34.34/?type=Invalid%20
Site&policy=MainPolicy which 30 seconds later redirects to http://pey-
vandha.ir, the site run by Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The 
former is only accessible from within Iran, and the latter contains a directory 
of recommended or approved sites, a list of reasons for banning a site, and 
a form to report a website thought to be in violation of the Iran’s computer 
crimes law. While in this study we used response codes as strong indicators 
of blocked sites, we also conducted additional tests concerning the relation-
ship between the 403 forbidden response and the presence of the block page 
URL. For blocked sites common to at least three lists (our test sample), we 
found that a 403 would be accompanied by a block page. It also may be 
noted that that http://peyvandha.ir ranks in the top 5 of Alexa’s (surfer’s) 
geoweb. As blocked sites redirect there, the site’s high ranking provides 
a relative measure of the amount of traffic to blocked sites from within 
Iran. 
Figure 4: Iranian traffic to YouTube comes to a standstill after the 2009 presidential elections. 
Source: Google, 2011b.
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Comparing multiple proxies can aid in confirming it 
is not a proxy problem. We used 12 proxies, which 
are hosted in six different cities in Iran and operated 
by a variety of owners, including Sharif University of 
Technology and the popular Internet service provider 
Pars Online. Concern has been voiced that it is “false 
to consider internet filtering as an homogeneous phe-
nomenon across a country,” considering that both the 
implemen Typically, when an Iranian proxy returns 403 
forbidden for a particular site, one is presented with an 
iframe loading http://10.10.34.34/?type=Invalid%20
Site&policy=MainPolicy which 30 seconds later re-
directs to http://peyvandha.ir, the site run by Ministry 
of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The former is only 
accessible from within Iran, and the latter contains a 
directory of recommended or approved sites, a list of 
reasons for banning a site, and a form to report a web-
site thought to be in violation of the Iran’s computer 
crimes law. While in this study we used response codes 
as strong indicators of blocked sites, we also conducted 
additional tests concerning the relationship between the 
403 forbidden response and the presence of the block 
page URL. For blocked sites common to at least three 
lists (our test sample), we found that a 403 would be 
accompanied by a block page. It also may be noted that 
that http://peyvandha.ir ranks in the top 5 of Alexa’s 
(surfer’s) geoweb. As blocked sites redirect there, the 
site’s high ranking provides a relative measure of the 
amount of traffic to blocked sites from within Iran. ta-
tion and user experience of censorship may vary by 
city, ISP, or even by computer (Wright et al., 2011: 5). 
Taking note of this concern, we selected proxies from 
different cities and ISPs, and subsequently considered 
the response code returned by the majority.
The proxies used for this research:
The results show that approximately 5 percent of the 
searcher’s web (179 out of 3547), 6 percent of the 
geoweb (29 out of 496) and 16 percent of the adver-
tiser’s web (238 out of 1,525 hosts) are blocked. The 
crowd-sourced web has just over 50 percent of the web 
blocked, with 2,382 of 4,579 hosts. Balatarin is the 
most aggressively censored Iranian web space with 57 
percent blocked, or 623 of 1,102 hosts, followed by the 
other two crowd-sourcing platforms—Donbaleh and 
Sabzlink—with more than half of the hosts blocked. 
Google Reader’s web, which in the research work thus 
far is standing in for the Iranian blogosphere, has 1,127 
of 2,541 sites (44 percent) returning the “403 forbid-
den” code (see Figure 5). 
As discussed above, the blogger’s web is largely Per-
sian language, and is one of the most responsive of all 
the webs under study, with 95 percent of the sites re-
turning 200 OK response codes. Moreover, it speaks for 
the use of Google Reader usage as a vibrant censorship 
circumvention culture. This study appears to render 
visible censorship circumvention at a large scale, or 
at least blocked websites are still online. Of the webs 
checked for filtering, the crowd-sourced sites as well 
as the Likekhor listing are the most blocked, raising 
the question not only of the substance of those spaces 
(we treat Balatarin’s below), but also the convenience 
of the platforms as URL lists for monitoring. Whilst 
many sites are blocked, and still responsive, we are 
interested in examining those blocked sites for other 
signs of health: Are they fresh? If the sites are blocked, 
yet responsive and fresh, we have a strong indication of 
the ineffectiveness of censorship (to date). 
 
The Iranian web and freshness
Having identified the spaces of particular interest to 
us (crowd-sourced as well as the blogger’s webs), and 
finding that they are highly responsive as well as heav-
ily blocked, we are interested in pursuing further the 
question of whether censorship kills content. Or, despite 
having their sites censored, do the bloggers keep on 
blogging, and does the crowd keep posting, and rating? 
Is there an expectation that the readers can routinely 
circumvent censorship, and thus the content can con-
tinue to be recommended, commented on, etc.? Apart 
from the responsiveness test (which found nearly all of 
the websites online), we would like to know whether 
they are active. Is the content on the websites fresh? 
We are studying a subset of the webs—the blocked 
sites in the crowd-sourced and the blogger’s webs. To 
determine how fresh these sites are, for each host (per 
217.219.115.133:80              ITC, Tehran, Esfahan
91.98.137.196:80              Sharif University of 
Technology, Sharif,                                           
Khuzestan
78.39.55.11:3128              ITC, Fars, Shiraz             
91.98.137.196:3128              Pars Online, Tehran, Esfahan
80.191.120.129:3128             ITC, Tehran             
213.217.43.82:8080             Pars Online, Pars, Tehran
217.219.115.137:80             ITC, Tehran, Esfahan
217.219.97.11:3128             ITC, Shiraz, Fars
80.191.122.11:3128             ITC, Shiraz, Fars
80.191.227.243:3128             ITC, Ahwaz, Khuzestan             
188.136.241.2:3128             Ariana Gostar Spadana, Esfahan,
188.136.156.116:3128            Ariana Gostar Spadana, Gostar, 
Hamadan
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list) we ask the Google feed API (application program-
ming interface) whether each site has a feed (e.g., RSS 
or atom). If it does, we parse the feed with the Python 
Universal Feed Parser library and extract the date of the 
latest post.11 Overall, 63 percent (5,147 of the 8,222) of 
the three webs have feeds. Of the blocked sites in these 
webs, 71 percent (2,986 of the 4,189) has a feed. For 
Balatarin, the percentage of blocked sites with a feed is 
79 percent (504 of 639 blocked hosts), for Donbaleh/
Sabzlink 68 percent (1,630 of 2,413) and for Likekhor 
75 percent (852 of 1,137).  These are the sites to be 
checked for freshness.
What constitutes a fresh site? We turned to blog 
search engines for advice about staleness. In an FAQ 
about blog quality guidelines, Technorati states that 
they “only index 30 days’ content, so anything older 
than that will not appear on Technorati” (Technorati, 
2011). Similarly, search engine and analytics system 
for blogs—Blogpulse—takes 30 days as a measure 
of fresh content: “A blog’s rank is based on a moving 
average of its citation counts over the past 30 days” 
(Blogpulse, 2011). Thus, freshness is here considered 
as having at least one post published via a feed in the 
last month, counted from the moment we last checked 
for blockage. Would we expect these sites to be fresh? 
To draw our findings into stark relief, it is of interest to 
note that the well-known survey conducted by Tech-
norati in 2008 found that only about 7 million of the 
11  The Universal Feed Parser downloads structured data feeds of many 
kinds, including RSS, Atom and CDF. It extracts post attributes, such as 
title, author, description, timestamp and link.
133 million blogs it follows had been updated in the 
past four months. The New York Times wrote that the 
finding implied that “95 percent of blogs [were] essen-
tially abandoned, left to lie fallow on the Web, where 
they become public remnants of a dream—or at least an 
ambition—unfulfilled” (Quenqua, 2009). In this event 
we have found that 65 percent of the sites overall are 
fresh. In the crowd-sourcing platform Balatarin, 78 per-
cent of the blocked hosts that have a feed (395 of 504 
hosts) are fresh; in the crowd-sourcing web organized 
by Donbaleh and Sabzlink, 56 percent of the blocked 
hosts with a feed (915 of 1,630 hosts) are fresh. For 
the Likekhor list, 61 percent—or 525 hosts—have a 
post date of a month before they were tested and found 
blocked. The results confirm that there is hardly a 
general indication that censorship kills content on the 
Iranian web under study. On the contrary, the most 
 severely censored Iranian webs are both responsive and 
rather fresh. 
The Iranian web:                
Voice and expression
A substantive portion of the research project, touched 
upon in the introduction, concerns employing the web 
in order to gain indications of conditions on the ground. 
Indeed, it is another “health check” in the sense that we 
are interested in the strength of voice, and degrees of 
expression in hard times. Has voice been suppressed 
and expression become more dulled online over the past 
few years? How would one make a measure of such? 
This particular piece of research builds upon the work 
Censorship on the Iranian web
Blogger’s web
(Likekhor)
Crowd-sourced web
(Donbaleh and Sabzlink)
Advertiser’s web
(Google Ad Planner)
Surfer’s geoweb
(Alexa)
Searcher’s web
(Google Web Search)
Relative size of  the Iranian web collection
Relative quantity of  blocked URLs
Crowd-sourced web
(Balatarin)
Figure 5: Censorship on the Iranian web, as measured through the share of 403 forbidden HTTP response 
codes. Data collected by the Censorship Explorer tool, Digital Methods Initiative (DMI), Amsterdam. 
Graphic by DMI.   
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on the Iranian blogosphere by John Kelly and Bruce 
Etling (2008). Prior to the 2009 elections, and the “col-
or uprising” known as the green movement, they wrote 
about the repression in Iran, and argued that the Iranian 
blogosphere organizes voice in a particular way:
Given the repressive media environment in 
Iran today, blogs represent the most open 
public communications platform for politi-
cal discourse. The peer-to-peer architecture 
of the blogosphere is more resistant to capture 
or control by the state than the older, hub and 
spoke architecture of the mass media model, 
and if Yochai Benkler’s theory about the net-
worked public sphere is correct in relation to 
blogs, then the most salient political and so-
cial issues for Iranians will find expression and 
some manner of synthesis in the Iranian blogo-
sphere. Future research could address whether 
or not this is true (Kelly and Etling, 2008:24).
We would like to inquire into “expression” by employ-
ing data from arguably the most significant Iranian 
website of the past four years, Balatarin. Balatarin, as 
discussed above, is considered here to be a set of URLs 
collected through a particular device culture. One of 
its salient features is the organization of the database 
that has been built up over time. Amongst other data 
held, Balatarin has the date that each URL was posted 
on its site since 2006. We scraped Balatarin’s database 
in order to obtain the top URLs (from all topic cate-
gories) that appeared on the crowd-sourced platform, 
and the dates of their appearances. Subsequently, we 
downloaded the pages that were linked to from within 
the Balatarin posts, so as to be able to query them for 
a series of words, effectively making the work desktop 
research (searching for words). Our word list is com-
prised of what in Persian are called “smelly” words, 
or language that would be considered critical and out 
of order these days (see appendix).12 We have devised 
12 The Persian term for “smelly” language referred to here is بودار. The 
word list was created through a collaboration by nearly 20 Iranian bloggers, 
whose blogs have been blocked by the state over the past three years. When 
their blogs were blocked, they began to compile a list of “smelly” words, 
such as open letter, manifesto, opposition party and political prisoner. To 
check the sensitivity (or, in our terms, fieriness) of the words, they would 
query each in google.com (http://google.com/search?q=smelly_word). If 
google.com was not blocked, and the query result was, then the term was 
considered censored (and indeed sensitive). Note that a blocked query result 
containing the fiery key word was not a criterion for inclusion on the word 
list, but rather an indication employed by the bloggers. It should be noted 
too that the words on the list are generally politically sensitive terms rather 
than routinely blacklisted key words related to alcohol, sex, etc., however 
a scheme of term types that we thought would allow 
us to judge the effects of the suppression over time 
on voice and expression. We compiled 539 words, 
which included terms and phrases, as well as names 
of individuals. For the analysis, we used 235 of the 
539, leaving aside phrases as well as many individu-
als’ names, with certain exceptions such as Neda and 
Mousavi (see Figure 6). The list was sub-divided into 
three categories (a word can fall into multiple catego-
ries): fiery, side-taking, and coded. By fiery language, 
we mean language that would be (nearly  intentionally) 
incendiary. If used, it would lead to the censoring of a 
blog or website. Side-taking language refers to terms 
that show (obvious) affiliation or alignment. The 
analysis of side-taking language enables not only an 
indication of the increasing partisanship of Balatarin 
(and the URLs its users recommend), but also to gain a 
sense of which language continues to be expressed, and 
which not, also as more and more websites are blocked 
by the state. Has that situation changed in the sense 
that more care is now taken in word choice? By coded 
or unspoken language, we specifically focus attention 
on language that is employed so as to not be blocked, 
or raise ire. 
All of the words on the three lists have been chosen 
for their significance as forms of expression regarding 
some of “the most salient political and social issues 
for Iranians,” as Kelly and Etling phrased it (2008:24). 
Our differentiation between types of words (fiery, side-
taking and coded) was made so as to gain a sense of 
behavioral changes, such as the rise of coded language 
together with the decline of the use of fiery words, to 
give one example. Also, would oppositional voices 
grow weary, or move underground (and use fewer side-
taking words)? Would the use of coded words become 
more prevalent as censorship (and harsher) activities 
expand?
We phrase our study as one concerning the organization 
of voice. In particular, we are interested in what we term 
the strength, clarity and volume of that voice, which we 
described above as continued usage of words over time, 
the choice of fiery and side-taking words over coded 
ones, and the sheer numbers of websites containing 
the words, respectively. Generally speaking, we found 
much the latter have been the object of study in larger inquiries into In-
ternet censorship in Iran (Open Net Initiative, 2005; 2009). The choice of 
politically sensitive terms fits with our aim, which is not so much the gen-
eral study of Internet censorship in Iran but rather the robustness of Iranian 
online expression of salient political and social issues.
Page 17
National Web Studies: Mapping Iran Online
that the use of the malodorous words has not declined, 
but rather has held steady, and actually increased, over 
the past three summers (2009-2011). As with fiery lan-
guage, the use of side-taking language grew in volume 
over the years. Instead of self- censorship (of the fiery 
language), a greater use of coded words over time, or 
the quieting of side-taking, we found louder and louder 
voices, using all word types more and more frequently. 
The finding is all the more remarkable for the fact that 
there has been a concomitant rise in the blocking of 
the sites where the language is published. As sites are 
blocked, they are not dulled, but rather enlivened.
 
That is, an exploration of the data shows not a decline 
but a general rise in the use of all of our language types 
over time, comparing their occurrence in the websites 
posted on Balatarin between June and July 2009, and 
in those same months in 2010 and 2011. (The words 
are held constant; we generally do not add new smelly 
words as they become en vogue.) Focusing on the 
 summer of 2009, around the date of the elections, there 
is, as expected, a significant rise in the use of fiery and 
side-taking (as well as coded) language after the elec-
tions on June 12, 2009. However, instead of a decline 
in subsequent years, as energies may flag and suppres-
sion spread, there is, as noted, only a rise in usage. The 
use of words termed fiery in the websites linked from 
Balatarin rose from 139,781 in June and July 2009 to 
167,735 in June and July 2010 to 252,986 in June and 
July 2011. There is not only an absolute but a relative 
increase. No general chilling effect was observed for 
the other critical language used on websites that rose 
to the top on Balatarin. The use of side-taking language 
increased from 365,602 occurrences in June and July 
Figure 6: The “redacted web” in Iran. The use of Persian fiery language on web pages linked from Balatarin.com, June 
- July 2011, with English  translation. The darker the color, the higher the percentage of blocked hosts containing the 
word. Graphic by the Digital Methods Initiative, Amsterdam. Data and additional graphics available at http://mappin-
giranonline.digitalmethods.net/.
Fiery Language 2011
Statistics for 2011-06-01 - 2011-08-01
139 distinct words recognized
249546 = the sum of word occurences (each word is only counted once per post)
89948 non-deleted and scraped posts
51412 posts with at least one fiery word
54169 posts with a blocked host
34252 posts with a blocked host and at least one fiery word
Color depicts the percentage of blocked hosts containing a particular word
0% - 20%
20% - 40%
40% - 60%
60% - 80%
80% - 100%
The tag cloud represents the percentage of posted links a particular word appears in.
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2009 to 444,592 in June and July 2010 to 620,883 in 
June and July 2011. The use of coded language rose 
from 69,911 in June and July 2009 to 73,589 in June 
and July 2010 to 103,013 in June and July 2011. 
There is a series of observations. At least for the web 
(and the voice) that Balatarin organizes, there is hardly 
a general indication of self-censorship. On the con-
trary, the words are to be found by censors (judging 
by the percentage of the same sites that have received 
their attention), and are in full view. We also appear to 
have found further indication of a hardy audience for 
the language, and perhaps routine censorship circum-
vention, if we assume that much of the readership for 
the fiery, side-taking and coded words is also in Iran. 
The use of critical language has increased, and the sites 
where the terms appear these days are widely blocked, 
showing a high rate of censorship activity and perhaps 
a concentration of monitoring of Balatarin. We are 
not able to report on specific trends in censoring sites 
which contain such language, as our censorship data 
are from August, 2011 only. Nevertheless, the overall 
findings are rather clear. It is a responsive web, blocked 
yet blogging, likely with an active readership, not only 
outside but also inside Iran. It would be worthwhile to 
collect the URLs as they pass through Balatarin (as well 
as Likekhor), and check for filtering simultaneously. If 
sites are already blocked when recommended, we have 
another strong indication of a culture of Internet cen-
sorship circumvention, in that there is an expectation 
that one is able to route around the blockage and access 
the sites. 
Conclusion: National web 
health index
In this study we have sought to build upon national web 
characterization studies, and put forward the emerging 
field of national web studies. We have done so first and 
foremost by making a methodological plea for captur-
ing and analyzing the diversity of national web spaces, 
or webs. Rather than predefining national websites, and 
thereby national webs, according to a principled ap-
proach of formal properties (for instance, all websites 
with ccTLD .ir, all websites in Persian with Iran-relat-
ed content, or websites with authors inside Iran), we 
have concluded that such approaches are often not to 
be operationalized or automated. Instead we propose 
to make use of what we term “device cultures,” and 
in particular the Iranian web spaces they provide, as 
the blogger’s web, the advertiser’s, the searcher’s, the 
crowd’s and the surfer’s. Device cultures more specifi-
cally are defined as the interaction between user and 
engine, the data that are routinely collected, how they 
are analyzed, and ultimately the URL recommendations 
that result. We have demarcated national webs through 
devices that “go local;” they have location or language 
added as a value that sifts URLs that are of relevance 
to Iranians and Persian-speakers. In an examination of 
the data sets, where we performed top-level domain 
analysis of the sample, we have found that the majority 
of the collected hosts from the various Iranian webs 
are .com websites, not .ir, a finding that expanded the 
scope of national domain characterization studies, and 
introduced a method of data collection for a broader 
national web studies.
 
Second, both building on as well as contributing to 
national web characterization studies, we have pro-
posed a rationale: a national web health index. It is 
conceptualized as a series of metrics, a limited number 
of which we have employed in this study, most read-
ily responsiveness, page age and filtering or blockage. 
(We also performed language detection and top-level 
domain analysis.) The contribution of this work to na-
tional web characterization studies is two-fold. The 
first is conceptual, in that we propose to repurpose 
metrics from national web characterization for  national 
web health indices. Are websites responding? Are pag-
es fresh? Are links broken? Is the code valid? Are file 
formats proprietary? A form of country profiling comes 
into view. The second is generalizable for countries 
that face state censorship, and applicable to our case 
study in question, Iran. We compare the  results from 
the responsiveness tests to the filtering ones. Are the 
blocked sites still responsive? The approach led us to 
find a significant number of blogs which were blocked, 
yet still responsive. The finding of so many blocked 
yet blogging sites also indicates an audience for the 
content, both outside Iran but also inside. We believe 
there to be widespread Internet circumvention in a 
particular space: the predominantly Persian-language 
blogosphere authored by Likekhor and Google Reader, 
which in tandem serve as an important filter for Ira-
nian blogs. Although heavily censored, the Iranian 
blogosphere as listed by Likekhor remains vibrant. 
This censored but active space is similar to the crowd-
sourced web organized by Balatarin. Blocked yet 
posting, Balatarin’s recommended websites also sug-
gest a similar finding as the one for the blogosphere: 
an active audience for blocked websites. In additional, 
substantive analysis we found that the Balatarin web 
(as a collection of URLs highly rated and thus rising 
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to the top of the platform) remains clamorous, perhaps 
even more so now than after the presidential elections 
of June 2009, and the initial rising of the green move-
ment. Whilst roundly blocked, the websites comprising 
that Iranian web are employing critical language that 
is fiery, side-taking as well as coded (at least accord-
ing to our three language category types we summoned 
for the analysis). It is a web that does not appear to 
be widely practicing self-censorship or one which has 
been cowed and drained of spirit.
 
Third, we would like to mention certain implications of 
national web studies as country profiling, both as it af-
fects current and future policies with respect to the web 
(and its study) and the use of web indicators for social 
study more generally. As we alluded to, regarding our 
early work on Iraq and the state of its web during the 
Iraq War in 2007, national web health study provides 
an additional set of measures regarding the current 
state of the universities, ministries and other institu-
tions. Where is the activity, and where is the neglect? 
It also may serve as a source of comparative study, and 
ultimately as a spur to addressing the ill health of one 
or more webs. Thus it is an approach to the study of the 
web that could have salutary consequences for portions 
of it.
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Persian queries English translation
Number of posts in 
which the Persian 
word appears fiery
side 
taking
code 
language
۲ دادرخ Khordad 2nd 652 1 0 0
۲۲ دادرخ Khordad 22nd 4723 1 0 0
۲۵ نمهب Bahman 25th 2132 0 1 0
تسیئتآ atheist 291 1 1 0
کدنوخآ mantis 180 1 0 1
یگدازآ Azadegi 3413 1 0 0
نایب یدازآ freedom of speech 3837 0 1 0
هاوخیدازآ liberal 1811 1 1 0
گنهآ music 13415 0 1 0
ا.ن A.N. 2198 1 0 1
داحتا alliance 9664 1 1 0
ینار سوبوتا bus drivers union 252 0 1 0
 رابخا۲۵نمهب news of Bahman 25th 1 1 1 0
یژتارتسا strategy 3911 0 1 0
یسیون سانکسا
writing on paper money (writing 
slogans on paper money) 370 1 0 1
ولناصا Mansour Osanloo OR Osanloo 22 1 0 0
تردق باحصا the people in power 65 1 1 1
 لصا۲۷ the 27th article of the Iranian 198 1 0 1
هیقف تیلاو لصا
the principle of Guardianship of the 
Islamic Jurists (velayat-e faqih) 714 0 1 0
تاحلاصا reforms 10960 0 1 0
یناسر علاطا spreading information 12447 0 1 0
هاپس تاعلاطا Sepah's intelligence service 1326 1 0 0
باصتعا strike 17034 1 1 0
اذغ باصتعا hunger strike 6503 1 1 0
مادعا execution 20597 0 1 0
یعمج هتسد یاهمادعا mass executions 17 1 1 0
هیملاعا declaration 3795 0 1 0
زبس هیملاعا green declaration 61 1 0 0
یداصتقا economic 35384 0 1 0
کیتسونگا agnostic 77 1 0 0
هنابش ربکا الله nightly Allah O Akbar 238 1 0 1
غورد یروطارپما empire of lies 32 1 0 0
تاباختنا election 49469 0 1 0
بلطراصحنا monopolist 79 1 1 0
بلاقنا revolution 51257 0 1 0
یلمخم بلاقنا color revolution OR velvet revolution 834 1 0 0
نیوا Evin 15630 1 1 0
وجزاب interrogator 903 1 1 0
تشادزاب arrest 33211 0 1 0
یگلابو یزاب blogging rallies 366 1 0 1
نیرتلااب Balatarin 28890 1 1 1
نارحب crises 18830 0 1 0
ماظن هندب body of the system 54 1 1 1
 دنب۲فلا section 2 A 98 1 0 0
 دنب۲۰۹نیوا نادنز section 209 of Evin Prison 343 1 0 0
 دنب۳۵۰نیوا section 350 of Evin Prison 2987 1 0 0
نتساخ اپ هب uprising 38 0 1 0
Appendix
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تیاهب Baha'i Faith 8 1 0 0
ییاهب Baha'i 3698 1 0 0
 لاس نمهب۸۹ January 2011 13 0 1 0
تنوشخ  یب nonviolence (movements) 8 1 1 0
هینایب statement 20929 1 1 0
یس یب یب BBC 5361 1 0 0
یسایس هدنورپ political file 18 1 1 0
رتسوپ poster 3557 0 1 0
هداز جات Taj Zadeh 2754 1 0 0
کیتکات tactic 1938 0 1 0
زواجت rape 17211 1 0 0
تاعمجت gatherings 3671 0 1 0
تلایکشت organizations 2321 0 1 0
فرصت occupation 6618 0 1 0
امیس و ادص فرصت occupation of the national TV (IRIB) 3 1 0 0
تارهاظت demonstration 23143 1 1 0
یرسارس تارهاظت nationwide demonstration 79 1 1 0
یمدرم تارهاظت people demonstration 351 1 1 0
بلقت fraud 10336 1 1 0
باختنا رد بلقت elections fraud 5 1 0 0
هاوخ تیمامت totalitarian 312 1 1 0
حاسمت alligator 903 0 0 1
سنوت Tunisia 3851 0 1 0
هعماج society 49036 0 1 0
یندم هعماج civil society 1945 1 1 0
تسایس زا نید ییادج separation of religion and politics 242 1 1 0
هوزج leaflet 800 0 1 0
 یناریا یروهمج Iranian Republic 15 1 0 1
 یهاوخ یروهمج republicanism 4 1 1 0
هیقف تیلاو یروهمج republic of Supreme Leader 99 1 0 1
شبنج movement 35113 0 1 0
اهگرگ گنج the wolves' war 65 1 1 1
پراش نیج Gene Sharp 151 1 0 0
تیمکاح rule 9752 0 1 0
یگناخ سبح house arrest 2590 0 1 0
وجزاب نیسح interrogator Hossein 83 1 0 1
شوش نیسح Hossein Shoosh 4 1 0 1
یا هریش نیسح addicted Hossein 5 1 0 1
رشب قوقح human rights 33448 1 1 0
نانز قوقح women's rights 3262 1 1 0
مکح sentence 24191 0 1 0
خ.ر Kh.R [G.R] 752 1 0 1
یمتاخ Khatami 26151 0 1 0
زبس یشوماخ Green Silence 209 1 0 0
نارواخ Khavaran 961 1 1 1
دادرخ Khordad 54343 0 1 0
دیع دیرخ Nowruz shopping 50 0 0 1
کاشاخ و سخ a pile of dust 3465 0 0 1
مشخ anger 6782 0 1 0
ناقفخ suffocations 2862 1 1 0
دولناد download 19786 1 1 0
یریگرد fighting 15677 0 1 0
یریگتسد arrest 15318 0 1 0
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توعد invite 21793 0 1 0
ییامیپهار هب توعد inviting people to demonstration 77 1 0 0
عافد defend 31866 0 1 0
شیدنارگد open minded 250 1 0 0
شابرگد LGBT 718 1 0 0
 یسارکومد democracy 20 1 1 0
تصش ههد 80's 1772 1 0 0
روتاتکید dictator 12677 1 0 1
نک ملاس نایاپ هب روتاتکید the end is near, dictator 112 1 0 1
یتموکح نید official governmental religion 19 1 0 0
ادرف ویدار Radio Farda 6394 1 0 0
دیما زبس هار the green path of hope 6749 1 0 0
ییامیپهار march 13952 1 0 0
تساجک نم یار Where is my vote? 421 1 0 0
زبس یاه هناسر green media 1 1 0 0
اناهر Rahana 1035 1 0 0
زبس ناربهر green leaders 1069 1 0 1
نز  یناهج زور intl. Women's Day 1 1 0 0
رگراک زور Labor Day 390 1 0 0
اه هشیر Risheha 696 1 0 1
خیرات یناد هلابز dustbin of history 59 0 0 1
نادنز prison 37708 0 1 0
کچرق نادنز Gharchak Prison 125 1 0 0
نیمارو نادنز Varamin Prison 5 1 0 0
دهشم دابآ لیکو نادنز Vakil Abad Prison 413 1 0 0
ینادنز prisoner 23505 0 1 0
یسایس ناینادنز political prisoners 17225 1 0 0
یدابآ دیز Zeidabadi 704 1 0 0
روخ سیدناس juice drinker 395 1 0 1
زبس green 43200 0 1 1
یچیپرس refusal 494 0 1 0
بوکرس suppression 18260 0 1 0
هلابز لطس trash bin 281 0 1 1
طوقس collapse 25283 0 1 0
رلاوکس secular 2483 1 0 0
یدارفنا لولس solitary 1384 1 0 0
ضارتعا یاه هبنش هس the Tuesday protests 64 1 0 0
بارهس Sohrab 8207 0 1 1
یسایس political 57438 0 1 0
یوبن ایض دیس Seyed Zia Nabavi 361 1 1 0
یعامتجا هکبش social network 2149 0 1 0
بارش wine 1657 1 0 0
ینارحب طیارش crisis conditions 540 0 1 0
راوگان طیارش terrible conditions 31 0 1 0
راعش slogan 18340 0 1 0
یسیون راعش writing slogan 972 1 0 0
هجنکش torture 12450 1 0 0
تداهش martyrdom 15885 0 1 0
اروش council 3869 0 1 0
زبس هار یاروش the green way council 269 1 0 0
عاجش خیش the brave sheikh 929 1 0 1
عناص Sane' 983 1 0 1
هلاژ عناص Sane' Zhaleh 653 1 0 0
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اکیرمآ یادص VOA 4379 1 0 0
یار قودنص voting box 510 0 1 0
متش و برض beating 8278 0 1 0
روج و ملظ oppression 367 0 1 0
 یاروشاع۸۸ Aushura 88 459 1 0 0
یعامتجا تلادع social justice 1369 0 1 0
 یناسنا مولع humanities 5 0 1 0
یا هریش یلع addicted Ali 105 1 0 1
هناحلسم ریغ unarmed 15 0 1 0
یشاپورف collapse 3204 1 1 0
یعامتجا راشف social pressure 33 0 1 0
یسایس نلااعف political activists 3138 1 0 0
یسایس تیلاعف political activity 1191 1 1 0
نیلاعف activists 5912 0 1 0
نکشرتلیف proxy-server as anti-filtering 1193 1 0 0
ملیف video clip 38021 0 1 0
ماع لتق genocide 5156 1 0 0
هنیطنرق quarantine 487 0 1 0
هعلق لزق Ghezal Ghaleh 40 0 1 1
باذک liar 298 0 1 1
یبورک Karrubi 30413 1 0 0
راتشک massacre 10167 0 1 1
یعمج راتشک mass destruction 344 1 1 0
نیپمک campaign 8687 0 1 0
کزیرهک Kahrizak 6537 1 0 1
اتدوک coup 10461 1 0 1
نایچاتدوک coup providers 1791 1 0 1
هاگشناد یوک Tehran universitary dormitary 3233 1 0 0
شرازگ report 72906 0 1 0
نامتفگ discourse 3430 0 1 1
کییلا secular 86 1 0 0
لاربیل liberal 1950 0 1 0
تسفینام manifesto 855 1 0 0
یدازآ نازرابم freedom fighters 36 1 0 1
هزرابم struggle 23879 1 1 0
تنوشخ  یب هزرابم nonviolent struggle 1 1 0 1
قلخ نیدهاجم People's Mujahedin of Iran (MKO) 1167 1 0 0
نیدهاجم mujahedin 9895 1 1 0
تیموکحم sentence 7629 0 1 0
میژر فلاخم opposition 335 1 0 0
یراتخم Mokhtari 1276 0 1 0
رب گرم down with 8837 1 0 0
نارودزم mercenaries 3883 1 0 1
هنادبتسم arbitrary 187 1 0 0
هناحلسم armed 3041 0 1 0
بورشم liquor 651 1 0 0
تیعورشم legitimacy 4579 0 1 0
رصم Egypt 14551 0 1 1
مدرم تابلاطم people's demands 674 0 1 0
یتاعوبطم press 5253 0 1 0
هقلطم totalitarian 4135 1 0 1
ناضرتعم protesters 13326 1 0 0
نیضرتعم protesters 2285 1 0 0
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یندم هلباقم civil disobedience 4 1 0 0
تمواقم resistance 14843 0 1 0
یندم تمواقم civilized resistance 237 1 1 0
هرظانم debate 6663 0 1 1
یوسوم Mousavi 42838 1 1 0
نهیم homeland 6563 0 1 0
یتیاضران discontent 3776 0 1 0
ینامرفان disobedience 2735 0 1 0
یندم ینامرفان civil disobedience 1903 1 1 0
همان letter 54699 0 1 1
هداشگرس همان open letter 3734 1 1 0
ادن Neda 11014 0 1 1
ناطلس اقآ ادن Neda Agha Soltan 2458 1 1 0
اهادن Nedas 474 1 0 1
رلااس شابوا ماظن uncouth regime 2 1 0 1
هدیسوپ ماظن rotten regime 29 1 0 1
سوحنم ماظن sinister regime 14 1 0 1
بهذم دقن religion review 17 1 1 0
هیقف تیلاو یعاجترا داهن The reactionary velayat-faqih 6 1 0 1
هپت تفه رکشین Haft Tapeh Sugar Cane 74 1 1 0
اناره HRANA 2280 1 0 0
 یگتسبمه solidarity 119 0 1 0
ارگ سنجمه homosexual 171 1 0 0
تاعلاطا ترازو intelligence minister 10012 1 1 0
نطو homeland 10173 1 1 0
هقلطم تیلاو absolute ruler 1046 1 0 0
نیسح ای Ya Hossein (2nd Shia Imam name) 1334 0 1 1
Screenshot of block page, http://10.10.34.34, indicating that the web user in Iran has attempted to 
access a banned website. Block page by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Iran, February, 
2012, captured by the Censorship Explorer tool by the Digital Methods Initiative, Amsterdam.
